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This Business of Business Cycles 
JE V O N S , an eminent English economist who lived from 1835 to 1882, is prob-
ably best known to the present generation, 
in this country, at least, as the propounder 
of the theory of sun spots. Jevons' general 
reasoning tended strongly to bring economics 
into relation with physical science, and he 
advanced the theory that there is a con-
nection between commercial crises and sun 
spots. The reasoning was somewhat in-
volved and had to do with the diminution 
of the heat from the sun and its effect on 
crops. In short, given sun spots of suffi-
cient size, Jevons contended that panics 
are bound to ensue. 
Looking back over the history of the 
United States for the past one hundred 
years, there are a number of crises which 
stand out. While they are sometimes 
referred to as panics it does not seem neces-
sary to differentiate between panics and 
crises, if, indeed, there is any substantial 
difference. The outstanding periods of 
depression began, respectively, in 1837, 
1873, 1893, 1907, and 1921. They are of 
some interest in examining the question of 
business cycles, because, with one excep-
tion, they have well defined points in 
common, and it is not unlikely, in the case 
of the exception, that sufficient investiga-
tion would reveal the presence of causes 
which are common to the other instances. 
Some of the panics synchronize with the 
occurrence of sun spots and crop failures; 
others show no relation to these phenomena. 
The panic of 1837, as it is usually called, 
followed a marked period of territorial 
and business expansion, with excessive 
extension of credit and speculation in public 
lands. The panic was precipitated by the 
suspension of specie payments, resulting in 
great financial disturbance, and was ac-
companied by crop failures. There is no 
evidence available apparently to show that 
sun spots appeared at that time. 
In 1873, due to over-expansion in railway 
construction, increase in the demand for 
iron, over-expansion in the iron industry, 
industrial expansion generally, inflation of 
prices, came another so-called panic. This 
depression is usually attributed to the fact 
that railroad development and construction, 
particularly through the west, was too far 
ahead of the transportation needs of the 
country, and as a result the roads with new 
extensions were unable to earn sufficient to 
meet the interest on the investment. There 
were no crop failures. There were no sun 
spots, but the depression was deep and 
far-reaching. 
Just twenty years later another panic 
occurred which lacked, generally speaking, 
the ear-marks of its predecessors, with 
respect to over-expansion and speculation. 
The panic of 1893 is traceable more clearly 
to lack of confidence in the ability or in-
tention of the federal government to redeem 
government obligations in gold and main-
tain a parity between gold and silver. In 
this year there were both sun spots and 
crop failures. 
The next panic occurred in 1907, and 
Bulletin HASKINS & SELLS 43 
may be charged principally to a group of 
bankers who were pyramiding bank stocks. 
A t that time trust companies were not 
members of the Clearing House, and were 
obliged to clear through banks which be-
longed to the Clearing House Association. 
The immediate cause of the panic was the 
refusal of one of the largest New York 
City banks to accept and put through the 
clearings of a prominent trust company. 
A financial crash ensued, and while business 
throughout the country generally was in a 
satisfactory condition, money became ex-
ceedingly tight, and it was necessary to 
resort to Clearing House exchanges and 
certificates, in order to keep the wheels of 
business moving. This depression was 
known as a money panic, and so far as 
may be learned there were no sun spots 
attending or preceding it. 
The depression of 1921 is so recent as to 
have come within the practical experience 
of everyone in the present generation, but 
a word or two regarding it may not be 
out of order. High prices, brought about 
by the demands of war and for a long time 
a demand in excess of supply, gave rise to 
over-expansion in plant facilities and over-
production generally after the close of the 
war. The things which sent prices tum-
bling were a decrease in demand which had 
been anticipated as a natural outcome of 
the readjustment process expected of 
Europe in its rehabilitation, and a buyers' 
strike in this country in protest against the 
excessive prices which had developed out 
of the war period. During this year sun 
spots appeared which were the largest on 
record, but at the same time there were 
bumper crops. It will be noted that this 
depression occurred just fourteen years 
after the panic of 1907, which is in accord-
ance with some theories as to recurrence of 
depressions. It will also be noted that the 
panic of 1893 was just twenty years after the 
panic of 1873, which is also in accordance 
with another theory regarding recurrence. 
The history just recited seems to prove 
nothing with respect to regularity or 
synchrony. In two instances during the 
past hundred years have depressions oc-
curred in accordance with theoretical 
lapses. In two instances have depressions 
been accompanied by crop failures. In 
two cases have sun spots appeared in the 
same year with panics, but only on one 
occasion have sun spots and crop failures 
coincided. Further, in the year 1921, 
when the depression was unprecedented in 
depth and sun spots were the largest in 
years, the crops were bountiful. There is, 
however, one feature which is applicable 
to all cases cited, except possibly that of 
1893, namely, that depressions followed 
over-expansion of one kind or another. 
First came speculation in public lands; 
next, over-development of railway con-
struction; then, speculation in bank stocks, 
and, last, over-expansion of investment in 
war facilities and munitions, and the other 
necessities and luxuries which follow the 
trail of war conditions. 
Imagination would indeed be needed to 
derive any fundamental principles with 
regard to panics from the experience of 
this country during the past hundred years. 
Almost anyone with intelligence would 
hesitate to predict the recurrence of panics 
with regularity. It does not require an 
especially keen sense to enjoy the humor of 
the sun spots suggestion. But out of past 
experience has emerged the theory, which 
appears to be sound, that as night follows 
day, and there is a succession of dawn, 
daylight, twilight, and darkness, so 
business conditions follow the sequence of 
depression, revival, elevation, and decline. 
Practical experience of the past five years 
needs no supplementary argument to 
prove the existence of a business cycle. 
Since 1918 we have seen prosperity followed 
by a decline; a severe depression recently 
giving place to a period of revival. 
Beginning with a period of depression, 
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plants are idle, inventories are large; de-
mand for goods is lacking; collections are 
slow; prices are high. There is labor un-
employment; wages are low; fixed charges 
are going on; losses occur, and failures 
increase. Incident to the revival, prices 
first fall; demand increases; goods begin 
to move; plants begin to operate; the 
demand for labor increases; wages increase; 
collections improve; fixed charges are felt 
less; losses decrease and tend to be trans-
formed into profits; failures are fewer. In 
the period of prosperity there is a demand 
for goods, steady and increasing; plants 
operate at capacity; plant enlargements 
are numerous; imagination, vision, enthu-
siasm, ambition, or what not, stimulate 
expansion; borrowings from banks and 
others increase; additional capital is 
sought, because prices tending higher and 
higher require more capital to swing the 
same volume of business; fixed charges 
tend to increase; wages increase, but lag 
behind the general price level; profits are 
the rule instead of the exception. The 
prosperity goes to the head. Business men 
are carried away with their success. They 
see visions of untold wealth and the power 
which usually goes with such wealth. 
Ambition leads to over-production; to the 
accumulation of excessive inventories at 
high cost; to the development of a price 
level which is out of proper relation. Then 
comes less demand for goods; bank credit 
contracts, and the decline which comes on 
calls for the liquidation of inventories; 
reduction of wages, with the accompanying 
dissatisfaction; the laying off of laborers; 
restricted operations; shattering of con-
fidence; a feeling of uncertainty, and busi-
ness is back again in the valley. 
The manufacturer of a certain chemical 
preparation distributed in large volumes 
and in which preparation arsenic is the chief 
constituent, makes prices in the fall and 
sells his product for delivery beginning 
during the latter part of February. Ar -
senic in the condition in which it is used in 
this product was selling during the summer 
of 1922 around 7 ½ cents. The price rose 
between August, 1922, and March, 1923, 
from 7½ cents to between 15 and 16 cents. 
Not all of the output which the plant was 
capable of producing had been sold by 
the first of December, when it was apparent 
that the price of arsenic was increasing 
rapidly, and that if the margin of profit 
computed on 7½ cent arsenic was to be 
maintained, it would be necessary to ad-
vance the selling price. Forward purchase 
contracts made provision for about one-
half the capacity output for the season, 
but there was no prospect of obtaining the 
remainder necessary to complete the quan-
tity required by the production program at 
anything like the summer price of 1922. 
Looking forward to orders not yet booked 
at December 1, but with confidence that 
such orders would be booked and have to 
be filled largely from higher priced raw 
materials, the manufacturer advanced the 
price, effective December 1. This step 
was based on cost calculations which took 
into consideration the probable price of 
arsenic around February 1, 1923, shortly 
after which deliveries would begin on 
orders for the season, some of which would 
have to be filled from arsenic purchased 
at an increase of one hundred per cent. over 
the price at which some of the supply had 
been purchased. This man is not a super-
scientific business executive. He is just 
an ordinary business man applying com-
mon sense to his own problems, and looking 
forward instead of backward. 
Like everything else, prosperity is some-
what relative. Comparisons, however, 
show marked improvement in profits now 
as compared with two years ago, and 
profits are as good an index as anything 
else of prosperity. A list of forty repre-
sentative industrials develops the interest-
ing fact that the net profits for the year 
1922 were 131 per cent. greater than those 
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for the year 1921. In the outstanding in-
stance, the concern in question showed an 
increase of 360 per cent. when the net 
profits for the two years were compared. 
Twenty representative railroads do not 
give such an encouraging result, since the 
increase in net for the list is only 17 per 
cent. The average, however, is brought 
down by three or four roads which suffered 
during the year 1922 from serious labor 
difficulties. On the whole the improve-
ment is marked, and the country generally 
appears to be approaching, if indeed it has 
not already reached, a period of prosperity. 
Notwithstanding this general condition, 
there is heard here and there the question 
as to whether or not things have begun 
to let down a bit and if certain signs noted 
signify the beginning of a decline. Some 
lines do show a slackening in demand and 
slightly more sales pressure is needed to 
keep up the volume. It is possible that 
the great activity in building operations 
evident in certain parts of the country has 
drawn potential individual purchasers away 
from the lines which they would naturally 
follow. Obviously the man who depends 
on a salary will , if he decides to build a 
house, be less likely to buy a new auto-
mobile. This factor in the aggregate may 
or may not be responsible for the apparent 
tightening in demand for goods. The 
whole situation is so complex that the 
present tendencies may possibly signify 
the beginning of a downward general 
movement from the period of prosperity, 
but the chances are that they will show, 
figuratively speaking, simply a saw-tooth 
in the general curve. 
While everyone may be willing to accept 
the theory of business cycles and recognize 
that they are comprised of certain periods, 
indefinite though the periods may be as to 
extent, the particular one which concerns 
everyone is that of prosperity. Given a 
period of prosperity the factors which break 
it are prices which are too high, over-
production, excessive inventories at high 
cost, and a decrease in the demand for 
goods. The apparent way to avoid or 
postpone the decline, therefore, would seem 
to be consideration and control of these 
factors. As a means to this end a greater 
study of those statistics which relate to 
general business conditions and activities 
would seem to be indicated. There are 
today many business men who compile and 
study statistics relating to their own busi-
ness. There are not enough of those who 
extend the idea to embrace a consideration 
of their own problems in their relation to 
the statistics for the country as a whole. 
With this added information, it would 
appear that there is some opportunity for 
the exercise of control over production and 
the relation of inventories. With the 
marginal price in sight, it seems natural 
that the business man who desires to 
maintain his volume should resort to the 
expedient of reducing prices somewhat. 
Sporadic effort of this kind might have 
little effect, but the combined forces of a 
herd have much to do with the direction 
in which the herd travels. 
Ten years ago a suggestion of this kind 
might have sounded like flying in the face 
of good business theory. Today the first 
notable step of this kind has been taken in 
a considerable discontinuance of building 
operations and projects. There is no 
quicker way to break prices than to shut 
off demand; there is no quicker way to 
induce buying than to reduce prices. It 
does not seem too much to hope that some 
scheme may be developed for stabilizing 
prices and otherwise regulating the factors 
which start a decline from a period of 
prosperity. The depression of 1921 was 
not a panic, principally because a panic 
was anticipated and discounted. Much 
was learned from that depression and the 
period of recovery which followed. With a 
proper fund of information and some con-
certed action directed possibly by some 
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government department, such as the De-
partment of Commerce, the present period 
of prosperity might, it would seem, be 
considerably extended. 
